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result reached by the application of the instrumentality exception seems to
be the same as the result in the recent state decisions which have rejected
the rule flatly.61 These recent state decisions indicate a trend among the
states to reject the proposition that the "mere evidence" rule is mandatory
on the states under Mapp v. Ohio, i.e. that it is a constitutional standard.
The states hold instead that the purpose of the fourth amendment was to
prevent general exploratory searches and these are prohibited and nothing
more.
Many state courts do not appear to have considered the issue. It will be
interesting to observe the result when they do. However, the ultimate
answer must come from the Supreme Court of the United States. Since
state courts are expressly disregarding the rule and the federal courts are
reaching a similar result through the application of the instrumentality ex-
ception, it appears that the answer may soon be forthcoming. This answer
may have already been indicated by the failure of the Supreme Court of
the United States to review not only the federal court decisions which
have tended towards dilution of the rule, 62 but also the state court decisions
which have clearly rejected the rule.63
Stuart Weisler
61 See People v. Carroll, supra note 33; People v. Grossman, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266
(1965); People v. Martin, supra note 35; People v. Thayer, supra note 30; People v.
Potter, 49 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1966); State v. Bisaccia, supra note 8; State v. Wade, 46
N.J. 48, 214 A.2d 411 (1965); State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.H. 109, 215 A.2d 16 (1965);
State v. Coolidge, supra note 44; State v. Cook, supra note 42.
62 Foley v. United States, supra note 14; Landau v. United States, supra note 14;
United States v. Guido, supra note 18; United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir.
1962).
63 Supra note 30.
CONTRACTS-REAL ESTATE BROKER-RIGHT TO
COMMISSION UPON VENDOR'S ARBITRARY
REFUSAL TO ENTER CONTRACT OF SALE
Stromer, a real estate broker, entered into an oral contract' with de-
l The fact and terms of employment were found in a counteroffer to the vendee
sent through the broker. In addition, when Browning's documents were delivered
to the escrow depositary, a brokerage contract signed by Browning was included. Cali-
fornia courts have held that signed escrow instructions, when of sufficient content,
satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Beazell v. Schrader, 59 Cal.2d 577, 381 P.2d 390 (1963).
Sufficient content means written evidence of an actual employment relationship.
Franklin v. Hansen, 59 Cal.2d 570, 381 P.2d 386 (1963). In addition to California there
are sixteen states which require brokerage contracts to be in writing before a broker
can recover his commission: Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wis-
consin, and New Mexico.
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fendant Browning whereby Stromer was to procure a purchaser for de-
fendant's ranch. In return Stromer was to receive a commission out of the
purchase money as, if, and when received from the purchaser. Stromer
found two brothers, Roger and Richard Wilbur, who desired to buy the
ranch. Negotiations between the Wilburs and defendant Browning re-
sulted in an oral agreement which Browning testified consummated the
deal. However, the parties agreed not to be bound until each had examined,
approved and executed the documents of sale which were to be prepared
by Browning's attorney. When these documents were presented to the
Wilburs, the terms of the oral agreement had been substantially changed.2
The Wilburs refused to continue negotiations and demanded the return
of their escrow deposit. Thereafter, Stromer brought suit against Brown-
ing to recover his commission. The Superior Court rendered judgment for
the broker. On appeal, the District Court of Appeals held that the broker
was entitled to recover his commission even though the vendor and vendee
had not entered into an enforceable contract. Stromer v. Browning, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1966).
This note will be concerned with the effect that a vendor's withdrawal
from negotiations with the vendee has upon the broker's right to a com-
mission. Furthermore, as will be shown later, the present law of brokerage
contracts denies compensation to a broker in this situation, whereas the
noted case allowed the broker to recover despite the fact that the vendor
and vendee had never consummated a contract. At this time it is sufficient
to state that the vendor's refusal to proceed may be warranted or unwar-
ranted. This discussion encompasses both situations, but stresses the area
of an unwarranted refusal since this was the situation in the noted case.
A brokerage contract is interpreted by the ordinary rules of contracts3
and a broker's right to a commission is determined by the provisions of
that employment contract with the principal. 4 In the absence of any
special contract, the broker is entitled to a commission when he has pro-
cured a buyer ready, willing, and able to purchase on the terms specified
by the principal. 5 The broker, however, is free to agree to any conditions.
2 A levee bordered the edge of the acreage that Browning wished to retain. Just
south of that levee the Wilburs proposed to set up a duck pond in the bean field. A pipe
equipped with a valve extended through the levee and water from Browning's land
would flow into the proposed duck pond. The oral agreement established the boundary
line as the center of the levee. Browning's final documents changed that line to a point
twenty feet south and gave control of the water pipe to Browning.
3 Kritt v. Athens Hills Development Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 642, 241 P.2d 606 (1930).
See also 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 59.
4 Uhlmann v. North Whittier Highlands, Inc., 167 Cal. App. 2d 758, 763, 334 P.2d 1022(1959); Pick, Licenses, Regulation and Employment of Brokers, Badeaux v. Rohrer, 182
Ill. App. 114 (1913). See also 41 CHICAGo-KENT L. REv. 41, 46 (1964).
5 Levit v. Bowers, 2 II. App. 2d 343, 119 N.E.2d 536 (1954).
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For example, the contract may specify that the commission is to be paid
out of money actually received from the vendee,6 or upon the successful
completion of the escrow, 7 or the vendor's procuring a trust deed.8 These
contingencies are express conditions precedent which must occur before
a duty arises upon the principal to pay the commission.9
Often the contract between the broker and vendor contains conditions
that the vendor must execute a contract with the vendee and the broker's
commission will be paid only upon the actual receipt of purchase money.
Assume the vendor and vendee enter into a contract of sale but the actual
transfer of title never takes place. Failure of the transaction could be
attributed to various reasons, 10 but of importance to this discussion is
failure due to the vendor's withdrawal. If that withdrawal by the vendor
is warranted, the broker is not entitled to his commission. The case of
Cotton v. Jewell Theatre Corp." illustrates this point. The vendor refused
to enter the escrow transaction when the escrow instructions were not
drawn according to his previous directions. The court reasoned that
where the action of the vendor was reasonable in view of the circum-
stances so as to justify his refusal to proceed, the broker will not be
allowed to recover his commission.
In a brokerage contract where payment of a commission is contingent
upon the actual consummation of the sale and the vendor and vendee have
executed a contract, an unwarranted withdrawal by the vendor will not
defeat the broker's right to compensation. In Coulter v. Howard,12 the
commission to the broker was to be paid out of escrow funds. The broker
produced a purchaser who negotiated with the defendant Howard for the
purchase of a twenty acre orchard. Prior to the transfer of title, the con-
tract of sale was repudiated by the defendant. The court held, that since
the vendor repudiated the contract, the condition in the brokerage con-
tract was excused and the broker was allowed to collect his commission.
The problem is compounded in the Stromer case.'8 Commission to the
6 Stromer v. Browning, 241 Cal. App. 2d 763 (1966).
7 Turner v. Waldron Realty, 209 Cal. App. 2d 376, 25 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1962).
8 Lawrence Block Co. v. Palston, 123 Cal. App. 2d 300, 266 P.2d 856 (1954).
9 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs S 663 (3rd ed. 1964). 3a CORBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 768 (1960).
10 The transaction may fail because the vendee was unwilling to close the deal in
which case the broker is denied his commission. See Ira Garson Realty Co. v. Brown,
180 Cal. App. 2d 615; 4 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1960). The sale may never be consummated be-
cause of the vendor's inability to convey good title, Swigart v. Hawley, 140 Ill. 186,
29 N.E. 883 (1892). The broker was allowed to recover his commission. However, if
the broker has actual knowledge of a substantial defect in the vendor's title he will not
recover his commission. See Shopen v. Bone, 328 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1964).
11 146 Cal. App. 2d 243, 303 P.2d 593 (1956).
12 203 Cal. 17, 262 Pac. 751 (1927). 1SSupra note 6.
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broker was to be paid out of money received from the purchaser. The
broker procured a prospective purchaser who negotiated with the vendor
but a contract of sale was never entered into because of the vendor's
peremptory action. Though the court in Stromer called the defendant
Browning a "repudiating seller,"' 4 there could not be a repudiation of the
contract since there never was a contract between the vendor Browning
and the vendees. What Browning repudiated was in effect an oral agree-
ment. However, it had been expressly agreed by the parties that no one
was to be bound by that agreement until it had been reduced to writing
and executed. Even in the absence of a contract of sale the broker re-
covered his commission because of the defendant's capricious refusal to
continue. As stated by Justice Friedman: "When consummation of the
sale is prevented by the seller's unjustified refusal to proceed with the
transaction, the broker is entitled to his fee."' 5 In effect, the court com-
pletely dismissed the necessity for a contract of sale. In support of this
reasoning the court cited Collins v. Vickter Manor, Inc.16 In this case the
vendor and vendee executed a contract of sale but the vendor arbitrarily
refused to fulfill his obligation. In allowing the broker to recover, the
court stated, "consummation of a final agreement was prevented solely by
the arbitrary refusal of the [seller] to proceed .... -17As additional author-
ity the court, in the instant case, cited Ratlaff v. Trainor-Desmond Co.'8
However, as in the Collins case there was a contract of sale between the
vendor and vendee and the broker was to receive a pro rata share of the
purchase money. The vendor assigned the contract to a third party there-
by making it impossible for the broker to receive his commission. The
court reasoned that the condition was excused by the vendor's act and
allowed the broker to recover his commission. 19 However, both these cases
can be distinguished from the case at bar in that each involved an executed
contract of sale whereas the Stromer case did not.
In Matteson v. Walker20 the Illinois Appellate Court was confronted
with the same factual situation as the Stromer case in that there was no
contract of sale. The broker's commission was contingent upon the yen-
14 ld. at 802. 16 47 Cal.2d 875, 306 P.2d 783 (1957).
15 Ibid. 17ld. at 881, 306 P.2d at 787.
18 41 Cal. App. 586, 183 Pac. 269 (1919).
19 In addition to the Collins case and the Ratzlaff case the court cited Coulter v.
Howard, supra note 12, and Turner v. Waldron Realty, 209 Cal. App. 2d 376, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 771 (1962). However in each of these cases there was a contract between the
vendor and the vendee.
20 249 Il. App. 404 (1928). See also: Crouse v. Rhodes, 50 IUI. App. 120 (1892) in
which there was an arbitrary refusal by the vendor to execute the contract but the
brokerage contract allowed for the payment of commission when the broker produced
a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy.
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dor's receipt of the purchase price and the defendant vendor arbitrarily
refused to execute the contract of sale. The court, even though con-
fronted with the defendant's capricious behavior, did not allow the broker
to recover his commission, stating that "the commission was only payable
upon the consummation of a sale, and while it may seem arbitrary for
defendant to refuse to carry out the sale . .. the parties must be bound by
their [brokerage] contract." 2'
In 1963, the District Court of Appeals of Florida rendered a decision
consistent with the holding of the Matteson case in Hahn v. Mark.2 2 Here
the court did not allow the broker to recover his commission holding that
the agreement specifying that the commission would be payable only when
title was actually transferred precluded recovery even though the absence
of a closing was due to the seller's refusal.
An analysis of prior case law indicates that a broker is entitled to a com-
mission when he procures a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on
the terms specified by the vendor,25 unless there is an express provision in
the brokerage contract that provides otherwise. If that provision makes
the payment of commission contingent on the execution of a contract
between the vendor and vendee, such a contract must be entered into
before a broker is entitled to his commission.24 In comparison, the Stromer
decision stands for the proposition that when the execution of the con-
tract between the vendor and vendee is an express condition precedent to
the broker's right to a commission and the vendor arbitrarily refuses to
execute the contract of sale, the condition is excused and a commission
must be paid. Furthermore, the court stated that the existence of a "formal,
enforceable contract of sale is not a precondition of recovery where, after
a meeting of the minds between the principals, the seller voluntarily repu-
diates the agreed terms. '25 However, all the cases cited by the court in-
volved formal enforceable contracts between the vendor and vendee.
While the court has extended present case law, it apparently qualified its
own position by requiring a meeting of the minds in negotiations between
the vendor and vendee. This case may be the opening of the door to allow
21 Matteson v. Walker, supra note 20, at 406.
22 158 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1964).
23 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS S 1030a (Rev. ed. 1936).
24 Prather v. Vasquez, 162 Cal. App. 2d 198, 327 P.2d 198, 327 P.2d 963 (1958); Law-
rence Block Co. v. Palston, 123 Cal. App. 2d 300, 266 P.2d 856 (1954); Cochran v. Ells-
worth, 126 Cal. App. 2d 429, 272 P.2d 904 (1954). In the latter case the court said that
with a broker's compensation contingent upon consummation, liability did not arise
until consummation.
25 Stromer v. Browning, supra note 6, at 802. For a discussion of the present state
of the law in Illinois, see 5 I.L.P. BROKERS § 84 (1953).
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the broker to recover his commission whenever the vendor makes an
inexplicable withdrawal from the proposed sale. It remains a matter of
conjecture whether or not the principle established will be accepted by
other courts when confronted with a similar situation.
Victor Savikas
CRIMINAL LAW-BURGLARY-UNLAWFUL ENTRY
IMPLIED IPSO FACTO BY INTENT OF ACCUSED
In response to an ADT alarm, police discovered the defendant in the
Chicago Historical Society Museum after closing hours. At the time of his
apprehension the defendant was situated in a room in which a showcase
was pried open, a screwdriver lay on the floor, and a button matching
those remaining on defendant's shirt was found nearby. Proceedings were
commenced by the State under the Illinois burglary statute; the State
electing to prosecute under that provision which makes unlawful an
unauthorized entry into a building with intent to commit a felony or theft
therein.1
Defendant was convicted and appealed contending that the requisite
element of entry without authority had not been established by the
prosecution. The conviction was affirmed, the Illinois Appellate Court
holding that the statutory requirement of an unauthorized entry need not
be shown directly by the State, but may be found presumptively through
proof of the preconceived intent of the wrongdoer to commit a felony
or theft therein. People v. Schneller, 69 Ill. App. 2d 50, 216 N.E.2d 510
(1966).
The importance of the Schneller decision is at once apparent when
viewed in conjunction with the requirements contained in the Criminal
Code of 1961, and other related decisions. In the case at bar the court
ruled, in effect, that the statutory requirement of entering "without au-
thority" will be established ipso facto where the entry is coupled with an
intent to commit a felony or theft. The holding thus serves to obliterate
the former requirement present both at common law and under prior
1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38 S 19-1(A) (1965) which states:
"A person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters or without
authority remains within a building .... with intent to commit therein a felony or
theft."
It is interesting to note that the State did not choose to indict the accused under
that portion of the statute which makes unlawful the remaining within a building
without authority. This would have avoided the controversial issue as to whether one
can enter a public museum during the period in which it is open, without authority.
